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A successful agreement on agriculture is essential for an overall agreement under 
the WTO’s Doha trade negotiations. Reaching agreement has been difficult, and as of 
August 2007, much still remains to be done if a successful agreement is to be reached. 
We consider three of the most controversial areas of the agricultural negotiations: the 
relative importance of domestic support, market access and export subsidies; three market 
access issues of sensitive-product exceptions sought for all countries, the additional 
special product exceptions sought for developing countries, the proposed special 
safeguard mechanism; and the domestic support issue. We show that decisions made on 
reform in these areas will have a critical influence on whether the negotiations achieve 
their objectives of promoting trade reform and reducing poverty.  
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The negotiations on agriculture under the WTO’s current Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA), like some previous GATT rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, have 
encountered many difficulties. The Doha Ministerial declaration in September 2001 
specified goals for agriculture of increasing market access; reducing, with a view to 
phasing out, export subsidies; and making substantial reductions in domestic support. 
However, the deadlines in 2003 for “modalities” and draft commitments were missed, 
and the Ministerial Conference in September 2003 at Cancún, ended in disarray. A new 
framework agreement was reached on 1 August 2004, but only limited progress was 
made by the Hong Kong Ministerial at the end of 2005, and the negotiations were 
suspended in July 2006 before a resumption of negotiations in early 2007 resulted in draft 
modalities in July (WTO 2007). As of August 2007 WTO members were weighing 
whether the potential gains are sufficiently large and widely enough distributed relative to 
any (political or economic) costs to provide a basis for an outcome that would command 
consensus.  
At this point in the negotiations, it is useful to take stock of the information that is 
currently available about the potential shape of an agreement, and to reflect on key 
uncertainties. This paper focuses on the key issues involved in the agricultural 
negotiations by first examining the broad features of the latest proposals under 
discussion; then considering three of the most controversial areas of the agricultural 
negotiations: the relative importance of market access, domestic support and export    2
subsidies; market access issues such as the sensitive-product exceptions sought for all 
countries, the additional special product exceptions sought for developing countries, and 
the proposed special safeguard mechanism; and then domestic support issues. Some 
conclusions on implications for the DDA are provided in the final section. 
 
1. The broad shape of a potential agreement 
 
While much is yet to be decided, much has been tentatively agreed, and the range 
of likely outcomes is spanned by key proposals. Likely features of a WTO agreement on 
agriculture include: a complete phase out of export subsidies, reductions in WTO-bound 
tariffs under the market access pillar, and reductions in WTO-bound domestic support.  
The export competition pillar looks the most straightforward, with agreement to 
completely abolish these measures. Subsidies under this pillar have been relatively minor 
in recent years compared with during the lead-up to the GATT’s Uruguay Round in the 
1980s (Hoekman and Messerlin 2006), so the major gain would be the systemic one of 
making them illegal and preventing their re-emergence. Even developing countries that 
benefit from subsidies on goods they import have pushed hard for the abolition of these 
subsidies, perceiving that the damage they cause to the health and legitimacy of the 
trading system outweighs their terms-of-trade gains.  
One early point of agreement in the negotiations was on the use of formula 
approaches for negotiating improvements in market access, domestic support and export 
subsidies. This reflects the need for more structured procedures than on the traditional 
GATT request-and-offer approach. It may also reflect the limited success of request-and-   3
offer negotiations relative to formula-based negotiations. Baldwin (1987, pp. 42-3) notes 
that the GATT’s second through fifth multilateral negotiating rounds (conducted using 
request-and-offer) yielded tariff reductions of only 2.5 percent per round, as against 35 
percent in the formula-based sixth (Kennedy) round of the 1960s and 30 percent in the 
seventh (Tokyo) round of the 1970s. The use of the formula approach provides a better 
basis for ex ante analysis than is possible in a request-an-offer negotiation, or in one 
based on a general rule such as the 36 percent average-cut formulation adopted in the 
eighth (Uruguay) round. 
 
2. The relative importance of the three ‘pillars’ 
 
A continuing issue for negotiators is the need to strike a balance between the 
efforts devoted to the three different pillars of the agricultural negotiations: market 
access, domestic support, and export competition. One surprising feature of the debate on 
this issue has been a tendency to stress the gains that might be obtained from disciplines 
on domestic support. A recent EC newsletter on agricultural trade policy (European 
Commission 2006) sets out to “explode the myths surrounding world trade”. First among 
these purported myths is a widely-quoted World Bank research result, publicized in 
Anderson and Martin (2005) and since explored in detail in Anderson, Martin and 
Valenzuela (2006), suggesting that market access barriers are by far the most costly 
global agricultural-support policies. 
The EC paper draws on a USDA study (2001, p. 6) which reports that market 
access contributes 54 percent of the impact of global liberalization, domestic support 32    4
percent and export subsidies 10 percent. It compares these results with World Bank 
estimates putting the contribution of market access barriers at 93 percent and an OECD 
(2006) study that puts it at 79 percent. A problem with this comparison is that the cited 
USDA numbers refer to the impact of reform on international food prices, whereas the 
World Bank and OECD results refer to impacts on global economic welfare. As 
Anderson and Martin (2007) note,  the same USDA report (2001, p. 37) estimates that 
tariffs account for 89 percent of potential global welfare gains– very close to the World 
Bank estimate.  
The overwhelming importance of market access estimated in these three studies is 
not just an artifact of the computable general equilibrium models they use.
1 The 
Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2006) study – published in the WTO’s own refereed 
journal – was designed to provide more intuition into the basis for this repeated research 
finding. To ensure transparency, it used widely available data and focused on a simple 
back-of-the-envelope model rather than a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
with its inherent complexities (Piermartini and Teh 2005). Its results confirmed the 
overwhelming importance of market access found in the studies using CGE models. 
Snape (1987) first highlighted the general point that domestic subsidies are likely 
to be much less important than market access barriers. He pointed out that subsidies are 
likely to be much less important than market access barriers because subsidies involve 
                                                 
1 Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2004), using a simpler partial equilibrium framework and extremely 
detailed information on tariffs plus official WTO data on domestic subsidies, also established the 
importance of agricultural market access barriers. Their findings were even stronger than the Anderson, 
Martin and Valenzuela (2006) results cited above. They found that reductions in domestic support would 
yield less than one percent of the gains obtainable from reductions in market access barriers.    5
outlays by treasuries and must pass regular budget scrutiny, while tariffs usually generate 
government revenue and are typically subjected much less rigorous review.  
Despite these results, domestic support should not be ignored in the Doha 
negotiations, not least because it is extremely important for some products of great 
interest to developing countries. This is particularly so for cotton, where Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2007) estimate that abolishing domestic subsidies on cotton would provide 
almost 80 percent of the $147 billion in total welfare gains to Sub-Saharan Africa from 
cotton market reform. There is also a systemic risk that restraints on market access 
barriers, if unaccompanied by restraints on domestic support, could lead some high-
income countries to replace market access barriers with distorting domestic support.  
The policy message to draw from these results is that reductions in domestic 
support cannot, alone, be expected to realize very much of the potential global trade and 
welfare gains sought from the negotiations, and that achieving improvements in market 
access is extremely important for a successful outcome in these negotiations. One reason 
countries put different emphases on the three pillars, and perhaps a reason the EU seeks 
to downplay the importance of market access, is that a large share of support for its 
farmers – and most of its food processors – comes from market access barriers. By 
contrast, domestic support measures are much more important in the United States (Table 
1). The table also highlights the much smaller use of domestic support relative to market 
access barriers in developing countries. Outside the OECD, domestic support accounts 
for less than five percent of total support to primary agriculture. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here]    6
 
3. Market access issues 
 
The recent draft modalities (WTO 2007) provide clear indications of many points 
of agreement, and of difference, in the negotiations. A key point of agreement is on a 
tiered or banded formula, under which cuts in higher tariffs are larger than the cuts in 
lower tariffs. This agreement is important from the viewpoint of economic efficiency. 
Since the cost of a tariff rises with the square of its rate, reducing higher tariffs more than 
lower tariffs generates greater economic gains than a similar-sized proportional cut to all 
tariffs. It also rules out an important route to avoidance of disciplines during the Uruguay 
Round—making larger reductions in lower tariffs in order to attain a target average-cut in 
tariffs. The choice of four bands allows for progressive increases in the rate of cut on 
tariffs, while reducing, relative to a two- or three-band solution, the potential problems of 
discontinuities associated with changes in the cut to tariffs (Jean, Laborde and Martin 
2006). However, with three band boundaries and four cut rates for developed and 
developing countries, the formulas are complex and their effects nontransparent—a fact 
that may have contributed to the difficulty in reaching agreement (see Martin and 
Messerlin 2007). 
Major sources of contention regarding the negotiations on market access involve 
the depth of tariff cuts in these four bands, and the placement of their boundaries. Three 
key proposals made in October 2005, and still relevant to the current bilateral 
negotiations, are those of the European Commission, the G-20 group of developing 
countries, and the United States. These differ in the placement of the bands, and in the    7
depth of the proposed cuts. The EC proposal (EC 2005) involves smaller cuts within each 
band, and higher band boundaries, and hence a smaller proportion of tariffs facing the 
highest cuts. The G-20 formula (G-20 2005) is more aggressive, with slightly lower 
boundaries for the tariff bands and higher cuts in each band. The US (2005) proposal is 
the most aggressive, with lower boundaries for the bands, and higher cuts within each 
band. In addition to the formula, each of these proposals involves tariff caps, which 
Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006) found to have important impacts on 
the benefits from reform. In the high-income countries, the EC and the G-20 specified 
100 percent, while the United States specified 75 percent. For the developing countries, 
the EC and the G-20 specified a cap of 150 percent. The July 2007 draft modalities drop 
these caps. 
Given the complexity of these tiered formulas, their impacts are frequently 
summarized by their impact on a measure comparable with the Uruguay Round result—
the average-cut in tariffs.
2 On this measure, the proposed G-20 formula without 
exceptions or a tariff cap would result in a cut
3 of almost 52 percent in EU bound, 
dutiable tariffs—almost one and a half times the comparable target in the Uruguay Round 
(36 percent). The reduction in the average tariff on all tariff lines is considerably higher, 
at 62 percent, because of the larger cuts in higher tariffs, even though this measure 
includes zero tariffs. The cut in the average applied rate is frequently considerably 
                                                 
2 In the context of the Uruguay Round, this measure overstated the extent of improvement in market access, 
since countries were allowed to make larger cuts in smaller tariffs. In the context of the Doha agenda, the 
average-cut understates the improvement in market access since the higher cuts are made in higher tariffs.  
3 These estimates are drawn from the widely-cited, unpublished, tariff simulations distributed to WTO 
members.     8
smaller, however, because of the presence of binding overhang (that is, gaps between the 
bound tariff rate and the applied rate) due to tariff preferences, non-binding tariff rate 
quotas, or applied rates below bound rates.  
For developing countries, the bands are wider—placing more tariffs in bands with 
smaller cuts—and the cuts in tariffs are smaller. The G-20 formula involved cuts rising to 
40 percent on tariffs above 130 percent. The proportionality principle in the framework 
guiding these negotiations since 1 August 2004 requires that the cuts to bound tariffs in 
developing countries be smaller than in industrial countries (WTO 2004, para 40). This is 
achieved in the four countries (Brazil, Egypt, India and Malaysia) covered by the 
simulations, with the average-cuts in bound tariffs ranging from 28 to 36 percent, even 
though bound tariffs in developing countries are typically much higher than in the 
industrial countries and hence subject to higher-than-otherwise cuts under the tiered 
formula. The July 2007 draft modalities propose increasing the size of the cuts in 
developing countries to two-thirds those agreed for the industrial countries, and allowing 
smaller cuts in members where the formula would otherwise result in overall average-
cuts above a level to be agreed between 36 and 40 percent. 
The degree of binding overhang in developing countries is more than double that 
in industrial countries (Jean, Laborde and Martin 2006, p. 91). This means that even a 
comparable cut in tariff bindings in industrial and developing countries implies a smaller 
reduction in developing than in developed countries. Further, these impacts are very 
different both between commodities and between countries. One important complicating 
factor is that some countries, and notably China, have very little binding overhang and,    9
hence, cuts in bound tariffs translate into much sharper reductions in their agricultural 
tariffs than in countries with greater binding overhang.  
Several categories of developing countries could make smaller cuts in their bound 
tariffs. The UN Least Developed Countries are not required to make any reductions. A 
group of economies seen as small and vulnerable, plus nine other African countries 
including Kenya and Nigeria, and Suriname, are likely to make cuts 10 percentage points 
smaller than for other developing countries. The draft modalities propose allowing cuts 
that are five percentage points smaller in each band for most recently-acceded members. 
As is typically the case in a formula-based trade negotiation, a great deal of 
attention is focused on flexibilities and exceptions from the agreed formula. As noted by 
Francois and Martin (2003), a tariff-reduction formula is inherently arbitrary. It therefore 
seems likely that allowing some flexibility to account for the particular interests and 
concerns of importing countries would allow a greater degree of liberalization than  in the 
absence of flexibilities—but only if the cuts in the formula are sufficiently deep to 
overcome the reductions in economic efficiency and market access resulting from 
allowing flexibility.
4 The key challenge for negotiators is to identify an approach to 
defining and treating flexibilities that will lead to this felicitious outcome, and avoid 
unintended sharp losses that can arise from seemingly-modest amounts of flexibility 
(Jean, Laborde and Martin 2006).    
There are three broad areas of flexibility under discussion: sensitive products to 
be available to all countries; special products to be available to developing countries 
                                                 
4 Anderson and Neary (2006) show that there are important differences between the tariff reductions that 
increase welfare and those that increase market access.    10
only; and a special safeguard mechanism that would allow developing countries to 
temporarily increase their tariffs above bound levels. We consider each in turn. 
 
3.1 Sensitive products 
 
The approach to flexibilities taken under the Doha agenda is more promising than 
in the Tokyo Round, where many products—particularly those of interest to developing 
countries, such as textiles, clothing and agriculture— were exempted by being withdrawn 
from liberalization (Baldwin 1987). Under the Doha agenda, the treatment of sensitive 
products, in particular, has been constrained by the requirement that “substantial 
improvements in market access should be achieved for all products” (WTO 2004, p. A-
6). This has required that at least some cuts be made even in products deemed 
“sensitive”. A key challenge when dealing with flexibilities is to ensure that they do not 
eliminate the liberalization that is the objective of the negotiations. A number of potential 
constraints are available. One is the percentage of sensitive tariff lines permitted . 
Another is restrictions on the share of imports covered or, as in the case of developing-
country non-agricultural flexibilities, on both the number of tariff lines and the share of 
imports (WTO 2004, p. B-2).  The size of the tariff cuts on sensitive products is another 
important parameter. A key question is whether any tariff caps should apply to sensitive 
products. A final parameter affecting the degree of liberalization achieved is whether 
liberalization should include expansion of any tariff-rate-quotas applying to sensitive 
products.     11
In the initial phases of the negotiations, very few of the parameters for sensitive 
products were defined. Analysis of the potential impact of sensitive products reported in 
Anderson and Martin (2006) made clear that the number of tariff lines alone was unlikely 
to be sufficient to achieve a reasonable balance between flexibility and discipline. 
Assuming sensitive products were chosen based on the size of the required cut in applied 
tariffs and the importance of the products as imports, Martin and Anderson (2006) are 
able to relate the change in the weighted average applied tariff  to the share of tariff lines 
treated as sensitive. They provide an example of a formula cut under which the European 
Union’s average agricultural tariff would be reduced by 40 percent in the absence of 
sensitive products. If sensitive products were completely exempted from liberalization 
this cut in the average tariff would decline very rapidly. With just one percent of products 
exempted, the cut in the average tariff falls by half; and with ten percent exempted, the 
cut falls to an eighth of its original level. The reason for this striking finding is 
straightforward—some tariff lines are much more important than others in terms of their 
potential contribution to improvements in market access. This suggests that it is 
necessary to focus not just on the number of tariff lines treated as sensitive but also on the 
depth of cut in these products—a range that extends from one third to two-thirds of the 
formula cut in the draft modalities (WTO 2007).  
The treatment of sensitive products has been linked with the presence of tariff-
rate-quotas—a combination of two potentially quite separate issues that considerably 
complicates policy formulation and evaluation. Where smaller tariff cuts are made on 
sensitive products, increases in market access are to be provided through expansion of 
tariff-rate-quotas (TRQs) as well as through cuts in out-of-quota tariffs.     12
Frequently, these TRQ expansions are interpreted as providing “compensation” 
for the reduced tariff cuts. There are, however, two concerns with this interpretation. The 
first is that TRQ expansion may not provide compensation because it is redundant. If, for 
instance, the tariff cut allows over-quota imports to expand by five percent, all or part of 
a five percent TRQ expansion may be redundant. The second concern is that a tariff cut 
on a TRQ product inherently provides less liberalization than the same cut on a tariff-
only product. This is because shocks to supplies, demands and world prices mean that 
tariffs may limit imports of TRQ products in some periods, while quotas may limit them 
in other situations. If the out-of-quota tariff limits imports in 50 percent of years and the 
quota limits imports in the other 50 percent, a cut of 60 percent in the out-of-quota tariff 
may provide only a 30 percent reduction in protection. If the goal is to achieve a 60 
percent cut in the original level of protection, the 60 percent cut in the out-of-quota tariff 
would then need to be paired with a TRQ expansion large enough to generate the same 
reduction in protection in years when the quota is binding—an expansion whose size can 
be estimated taking into account the price reduction implied by the tariff cut and the 
elasticity of import demand. If the goal is to reduce protection by 60 percent of its initial 
level, any “compensation” for a tariff cut not taken would be in addition to the TRQ 
expansion needed to reduce protection by 60 percent in years where imports are 
determined by the quota regime.  
    13
3.2 Special products 
 
Proposals for special products have frequently been justified as a means of 
dealing with problems faced by small producers in developing countries. The best-
articulated proposals (eg G-33 2006) focus on criteria of improving food security, 
livelihood security and rural development. Indicators used to identify these products 
include that the product be a staple food, that it have a large share in food expenditure in 
the country, and/or that it be produced by subsistence farmers. A potential concern is that 
protection for such products may reduce rather than increase the food and livelihood 
security of poor people, even if it improves the income situation of farmers who are net 
sellers of those products. This concern arises from the fact that poor people in poor 
countries frequently have extremely high expenditure shares on staple foods. Cranfield, 
Hertel and Preckel (2006) estimate that the poorest households allocate almost three-
quarters of their total budgets to staple foods. At the same time, subsistence farmers tend 
to focus on production of staples for their own consumption. If a poor, subsistence-
oriented household produces grain valued at $100 but consumes $90 worth and earns 
only $10 from sales, then raising the price by 10 percent will increase household income 
by only $1. By contrast, the real income of a poor household that purchases all of its 
staple foods would fall by about $7.50. The exact numbers will depend on the specific 
situation of each country, so this effect needs to be evaluated empirically but there seem 
to be strong grounds for caution in assuming that protection of staple foods will improve 
the situation of poor people.     14
Many of the arguments for special product protection appear to be based on a 
presumption that raising agricultural prices (as, for example, occurred when export 
barriers on rice in Vietnam were removed) will reduce rural poverty, and hence improve 
income and food security. Indeed, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) find that raising the 
price of rice in Vietnam made many low-income households better off. That example 
seems of limited relevance to the special products debate, however, since import 
protection does not raise the price of exportable goods. Morley and Pineiro’s (2004) 
finding that world trade liberalization causes world food prices to rise, and poverty to fall 
in Latin American countries, is also sometimes used to suggest a link between higher 
food prices and poverty reduction. However, these results do not seem to make a case for 
agricultural protection—the study is, after all, an analysis of global trade liberalization. 
Part of the reason they find that poverty falls in Latin America is the abolition of 
protection in these countries, which reduces the domestic prices of some foods in these 
countries. The increases in world prices that benefit Latin America’s many net exporters 
are also irrelevant to the question of the impact of countries’ providing protection to their 
special products. Exporting developing countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Argentina are also concerned that extensive use of special product 
exceptions might reduce their opportunities to expand south-south exports and thereby 
reduce poverty in their countries.   
The major study on trade and poverty by Hertel and Winters (2006) stresses that 
the relationship between trade reform and poverty is very complex, with complementary 
policies heavily influencing the outcome. Nonetheless it finds a general tendency for 
liberalization to result in poverty reduction, underscoring the point that raising the prices    15
of staple foods may well increase poverty in poor countries rather than reduce it. The 
recent finding (World Bank 2006) that the price increases resulting from the ban on rice 
imports into Indonesia had thrown three million people into poverty between 2005 and 
2006 provides a specific example of how raising prices of importable food staples 
through protection can increase poverty. 
 
3.3 Special safeguard mechanism 
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture provided access to a special 
safeguard (SSG) for countries that had converted their non-tariff barriers into tariffs in 
the Uruguay Round. Most high-income countries have access to this contingent 
protection measure while few developing countries do because most of them made use of 
the option for “ceiling” bindings. The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2005, p. 
A6) and subsequent draft modalities include a special safeguard mechanism (SSM) for 
developing countries with a price trigger, and a quantity trigger designed to provide 
temporary protection in response to import “surges”.  
It is true that low prices can be a serious problem for producers with inadequate 
access to finance intertemporal smoothing of consumption, while price peaks can be a 
problem for poor consumers. However, safeguard instruments focused on import 
“surges” are not necessarily synonymous with producer revenue stabilization–  the effect 
depends on the source of the shocks and on the price elasticities in the markets involved. 
They might be if the shocks are exclusively from exogenous world prices, but need not be    16
if the shocks arise from domestic sources such as crop yield fluctuations, and certainly 
will not be if the import surges arise from variations in domestic demand.  
Another important point to consider is the risk that such schemes will be captured 
by vested interests. The history of price stabilization schemes is replete with schemes 
whose avowed purpose was to stabilize, but whose actual effect was largely to raise 
prices (perhaps EU intervention policies, or the Australian wool reserve price scheme) or 
to lower them (commodity boards in Africa), depending on the power of the dominant 
interest groups involved. This history suggests a need for caution in the design of such an 
instrument to avoid weakening hard-won WTO disciplines for which a major role is to 
reduce the ability of special interests to create trade distortions. 
Quantity triggers of the type discussed in G-33 (2006), Paraguay and Uruguay 
(2006) and USA (2006) pose particular dangers, for three reasons. First, there is the risk 
that they will run counter to the objectives of the mechanism. If implemented—perhaps 
because of interest-group pressure—in response to an increases in domestic demand, they 
can destabilize domestic prices and producer revenues. Second, there is a risk that they 
will allow the market to be closed frequently, rather than merely under the exceptional 
circumstances envisaged in proposals for such a mechanism. Simulations reported by 
Paraguay and Uruguay (2006) suggest that this could be the case with the parameters 
included in the G-33 proposal. Third, there is a risk is of cumulative market closure, 
again perhaps in response to interest group pressures. If a measure is invoked, imports 
can be expected to decline, and the lower level of imports becomes part of the trigger for 
the following three years. This, in turn, makes it easier to invoke the measure in 
subsequent years.     17
In addition to these concerns about the impact of an SSM at the individual market 
level, there are concerns about the impact on global markets. If trade expands, or world 
prices fall, it is likely that a number of markets would introduce safeguard measures. A 
consequence of this is likely to be increased instability of world markets. This instability 
would, in turn, lead to pressure for more intensive use of safeguards, and hence to further 
increases in world market instability.  
The challenge in this area is to devise an approach that allows the risks to be 
managed in a way that meets the valid concerns underlying SSM proposals without 
exacerbating distortions to world markets. Doing so will require careful attention both to 
the design of the measures used and to the specification of magnitudes such as the 
quantity price triggers to be adopted. The current research base seems inadequate to meet 
the needs of policy makers in this area.  
 
4. Domestic support issues 
 
There has been considerable dissatisfaction with the constraints on domestic 
support negotiated under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. Part of the 
problem was that the commitment levels negotiated by the USA and the EU in that 
Round provided a great deal of flexibility, partly because of the choice of base years, and 
partly because these constraints only applied to agriculture as a whole, and not to 
individual commodities. Another source of concern was the fact that the de minimis limits 
for product and non-product-specific support were not only substantial (5 percent), but 
could be counted twice—once for product-specific support and once for non-product-   18
specific support, allowing a larger amount of such support than was perhaps originally 
envisaged.   
In addition, it had become clear that one of the intended constraints on domestic 
support had become an escape valve. Support provided by administered prices appears to 
have been included in the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) in order to impose an 
additional constraint on this form of protection. However, this created an opportunity to 
relax their domestic support constraints by replacing administered prices by a system, 
potentially identical in effect, under which domestic prices were supported by adjusting 
border measures. Doing this, as Japan did with its support to rice, removed this support 
from the AMS, while leaving the commitments based on the presence of an administered 
price unchanged—creating a larger gap between commitments and actual protection.    
The latest proposals include restrictions on the Aggregate Measure of Support, on 
the Overall Trade-Distorting Support, on the Blue Box (support tied to production-
limiting programs), on de minimis support, and on support to individual commodities. 
Proposals by the US, the EU and the G-20 in October 2005 still underpin the current 
negotiations. Brink (2005) provides an excellent introduction to the analysis of WTO 
constraints on domestic support. Some key features of these proposals are summarized in 
Table 2. Fortunately a tiered-formula approach to reducing domestic support is proposed, 
such that the largest reductions are to be made in the countries with the largest absolute 
amount of domestic support. 
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 near here] 
Figure 1 shows the extent to which committed levels of the Aggregate Measure of 
Support exceed the actual levels, and shows just how much the commitment levels must    19
be cut if they are to begin to reduce actual levels of support. It shows that only the US is 
likely to face substantial cuts in actual support levels under all of the proposals under 
discussion—which is perhaps part of the reason that it is more defensive in this area of 
the negotiations than in other areas. However, the EU might also need to make reductions 
in support relative to historical levels under the US and G-20 proposals. The differences 
in the cut proposals by the US, EU and others reflect to a considerable extent the different 
degrees of reliance they each have on the respective pillars in their agricultural support 




There has been significant progress on at least some of the key parameters in the 
negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda in the twelve months to mid-2007. 
The proposed reductions in bindings, when translated into cuts in actual delivered 
support, appear to be large relative to the reductions achieved in the Uruguay Round. In 
market access, they involve reducing high tariffs, tariff peaks and tariff escalation in 
ways not attempted in the Uruguay Round. In domestic support, they involve critically 
important restrictions on blue box measures and on product-specific support as well as 
substantial reductions in total support limits. And the abolition of export subsidies would 
undeniably be an important achievement.  
Given the importance of agriculture for economic development (World Bank 
2007) the fact that the proposed reductions in tariff bindings in developing countries are 
large relative to those undertaken in previous rounds is also encouraging. The ‘special    20
and differential treatment’ principle leads to them being smaller than those in the 
industrial countries, and the greater binding overhang in developing countries leads to 
their impact on applied tariffs being smaller again, but they are nonetheless non-trivial. 
However, exceptions for least developed countries and for small and vulnerable 
developing economies reduce the prospective net economic gain for those countries, as 
do proposals for special product exceptions in developing countries that would allow 
them to maintain tariffs higher than would be possible in the absence of these 
flexibilities. And if the special products are chosen according to criteria such as being 
important staple foods produced by subsistence farmers, there is a risk that this will 
reduce the income security of many poor people who are net buyers of food. 
Recent advances in databases and analytical tools mean that the research 
community can contribute much more directly to informing policy decisions and 
prospective negotiating positions. This is a very different situation from  previous rounds, 
where it was not possible to make useful analytical contributions in the later, more 
detailed, and more contentious stages of these negotiations. Inevitably, though, such 
analyses risk being controversial. 
Despite recent advances, analysts will continue to need to work hard to improve 
analytical toolkits in this trade policy field. One area is in analyzing the impacts of policy 
reforms on households, and particularly on poor households, rather than simply on 
countries as a whole. Another is to take into account the dynamic impacts of reform, 
perhaps using some of the approaches developed in work following Melitz (2003) and 
surveyed in Francois and Martin (2007) and Martin and Anderson (2008). And much 
more, and better, analysis will be needed once more-definitive offers are available.    21
The evidence to date suggests that what is (possibly) within the reach of DDA 
negotiators is a very substantial agreement—much more so than the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture in terms of cuts both in bound tariffs and subsidies and in 
actual delivered levels of farm protection and support. There is also a potential Doha 
agreement on non-agriculture that is substantial, plus an as-yet unknown degree of 
commitment to reform policies affecting markets for services. In July 2007 the Chairs of 
the Agricultural and the NAMA negotiations provided new texts for members to consider 
as they try to narrow their differences. True, many developing countries remain cautious 
about undertaking more liberalization commitments, and the fast track authority for the 
US President expired on 30 June 2007, so agreement may yet prove elusive or still be 
some years away. Our hope is that, when deciding what commitments to make, the 
governments and citizens of those countries will at least be aware of economic analyses 
that suggest deeper liberalization generally leads to greater income gains and—
particularly if accompanied by appropriate complementary policies—to greater 
reductions in poverty. 
    22
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Table 1: Agricultural subsidies and applied tariffs, by region, 2001 
 
    ( p e r c e n t )  
 




















OECD countries  13.5  0.8  16.9    3.3  17.0 
Australia   2.9  0.0  1.0   0.0  9.1 
New Zealand   0.3  0.0  0.4   0.0  2.7 
United States   16.2  0.0  1.1   0.2  3.2 
Canada   10.6  0.0  1.3   0.0  13.6 
Mexico   8.8  0.0  10.7   0.0  12.2 
European Union (EU15)  17.7  4.4  7.4   8.6  17.9 
Norway and Switzerland   39.8  4.2  29.5   3.9  31.4 
Other European members  10.7  0.0  6.2   1.4  17.0 
Turkey   3.1  0.2  15.9   1.6  18.0 
Japan   6.0  0.0  27.8   0.0  31.4 
Korea   3.6  3.3  146.4   0.0  26.1 
            
Non-OECD countries  0.7  0.0  14.9    0.0  17.5 
E. Europe & Central Asia  0.5  0.0  8.9   0.2  18.0 
East Asia & Pacific  0.0  0.0  32.9    0.0  19.8 
China   0.0  0.0  50.8   0.0  18.3 
Indonesia   0.0  0.0  1.8   0.0  9.0 
Other E. Asia & Pacific  0.0  0.0  16.8   0.0  22.9 
South Asia   3.0  0.0  17.8    0.0  50.9 
Bangladesh   0.1  0.0  6.3   0.0  19.7 
India   3.4  0.0  25.5   0.0  76.4 
Other South Asia  2.3  0.0  13.4   0.0  29.9 
Middle East & North Africa  0.0  0.6  10.3    0.0  16.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.2  0.0  9.3   0.0  21.3 
South Africa Custom Union  0.0  0.0  6.3   0.0  8.3 
Other Southern Africa  0.4  0.0  11.0   27.2  0.4 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  0.1  0.0  10.4   0.0  24.5 
Latin America & Caribbean  0.4  0.0  6.7    0.0  11.1 
Argentina   0.0  0.0  4.7   0.0  7.6 
Brazil   1.3  0.0  2.4   0.0  8.6 
Other Latin America & Carib.  0.0 0.0  8.6   0.0  11.8 
    28
a  The ratio of subsidies to the value of primary agriculture production at market prices. 
(That is, domestic support is estimated by measuring value wedges between payments at 
agents’ prices and at market prices.) These payments are by commodity and region to 
final output, factors of production, domestic intermediate inputs, and imported 
intermediate inputs.  
b Export subsidy rates are the ratio of subsidy payments over the value of exported 
commodities. Trade weights are used for aggregation. 
c Intra-EU15 trade is ignored in EU and world trade in calculating import weights. 
 d There are no domestic production subsidies on processed agricultural products. 
Source: Calculations from GTAP database 6 by Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela 
(2006). 
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Table 2: Domestic support proposals by the US, the EU and the G-20 as of October 2005 
(percent) 
 
 USA  EU  G-20 
AMS     
EU  83 70 80 
Japan 83  60+  80 
USA  60 60 70 
Canada  37 50 60 
Brazil ?  ?  60 
 
OTDS 
   
EU  75 70 80 
Japan 53  ?  75 
USA  53 60 75 
Canada  31 50 70 
     
Cut de minimis by:  50  80  Adjust to overall 
cap 
Cap on Blue  2.5  5  5 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Brink (2005)    30
 




Note: The shaded portion of the bars shows the gap between the maximum commitment 
levels, and actual support levels. 
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